Reproducible Builds

Tamper evidence

Any build-time injection — compiler backdoor, compromised dependency, or tampered CI runner — would alter the output binary and produce a diverging SHA-256 digest. Matching digests across independent environments are cryptographic evidence of an unmodified build.

Independent verification

Two independent build environments under separate administrative control constitute an N-of-M verification model: a supply-chain attacker would need to compromise both infrastructure providers simultaneously, across different jurisdictions, to go undetected.

Nix-powered

Nix models each build as a pure function over a content-addressed input closure. Every dependency is pinned to a cryptographic hash in the Nix store, eliminating non-determinism from timestamps, locale settings, and floating dependency resolution.

Signed images

Each image digest is signed with Cosign against a static public key. Verifying the signature cryptographically binds the digest to the key holder, making unauthorized image substitution detectable.

Build provenance

SLSA provenance attestations, encoded in the in-toto predicate format, record the exact source revision, build platform, and entry-point invocation. They allow a verifier to reason about the full build provenance chain — from source commit to published digest.

VEX and SBOM

Each image carries a CycloneDX SBOM attestation enumerating all transitive dependencies with their cryptographic hashes, and an CycloneDX VEX attestation asserting the exploitability status of known CVEs — enabling precise, machine-readable vulnerability impact analysis.